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Abstract: 
Investors in mutual funds have the unenviable task of disentangling two mutually 
confounding effects. First, to fathom the future performance of the funds based on 
current evidence, and second, to assess how well the mutual fund managers will 
steward their investments under uncertain economic conditions. We corroborate the 
dependence of weighted risk-adjusted returns (viz. the Star Ratings) on corporate 
governance score (viz. Stewardship Grade) accounting for fund specific 
characteristics. We document Stewardship scores Granger cause Star Rating. We 
propose an objective data-driven corporate governance score based on the 
components of Stewardship Grade. Both the static and dynamic fixed-effects models 
show strong predictive relationship between performance with corporate governance 
accounting for the endogeneity bias from unobserved fund-specific traits. We 
conclude that corporate governance scores form an effective yet low-cost tool for 
predicting performance, hence mutual fund investors can only focus on one problem, 
i.e., find the better stewards for their funds. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Mutual fund investors have the daunting task of choosing which funds to invest in 
from thousands of available funds. We can analyze their dilemma as two seemingly 
mutually confounding problems. First, to fathom the future performance of the funds 
based on current available evidence, and second, to assess how well the mutual fund 
managers steward their investments under uncertain economic conditions.  
 
It has been well established that the relationship between past and future short-
term performance (or “hot hands”) of mutual fund managers are tenuous at best (Jensen, 
1969, Grinblatt and Titman, 1992 , Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1993, Goetzmann 
and Ibbotson, 1994, Brown and Goetzmann, 1995, Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996, 
Carhart, 1997). In this paper, we explore what role Morningstar Stewardship Grades (a 
corporate governance score for mutual funds) play in mutual fund performance. 
 
The Morningstar Star Ratings have been widely used by retail and institutional 
investors alike as tools for selecting mutual funds. A comprehensive study on the 
influence of the Star Ratings found significantly large inflows in response to rating 
upgrades or initiation of top rating (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008). The enormous 
popularity of the Star Ratings has prompted other researchers to study their effectiveness 
as a performance measure. One such strand of research focuses on gauging the predictive 
ability of these ratings. It was documented that poor ratings indeed indicate weak future 
performance but good ratings were rarely followed by superior returns for a sample of   3
funds rated by Morningstar between 1992 and 1997 (Blake and Morey, 2000). 
Subsequent work examining funds rated after June 2002
1  found that best-rated funds 
outperform lower-rated funds over a three-year post-rating period (Morey and Gottesman, 
2006). 
 
Adam Smith observation in the Wealth of Nations, “…Like the stewards of a rich 
man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, 
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company” (Smith, 1776, 700) almost prophetically lends its voice to the world of mutual 
funds governance in the beginning of the millennium. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the eruptions of the 2003 U.S. mutual fund scandals that involved 
late trading, market timing and other irregularities put corporate governance of mutual 
funds in the spotlight, and subsequently led to a series of regulatory reforms. One 
interesting development that ensued was the launch of the Morningstar Fiduciary Grades 
(renamed the Stewardship Grades in 2005) which evaluated funds based not on their past 
performance, but on their standard of corporate governance. Stewardship Grades, ranging 
from A (best) to F (worst), are calculated as the aggregate scores of five components – 
Corporate Culture, Board Quality, Manager Incentives, Fees and Regulatory History (cf. 
Morningstar, 2007). 
 
                                                 
1 Morningstar changes its rating methodology in June 2002. 
 
   4
Corporate Finance literature has long established the nexus between corporate 
governance and mutual funds as large shareholders. Past academic interests have 
reviewed on how regulations, through restrictions on ownership concentration and 
control, have restrained institutional investors like mutual funds from playing an 
influential role in the governance of corporations whose assets they own (Roe, 1990, 
Shleiffer and Vishny, 1997, p. 38; for a more current outlook, see Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). However, interest in the corporate governance of the mutual funds themselves is 
of more recent vintage. Although academic research on corporate governance of large 
investors like mutual funds is still burgeoning, scholarly work on mutual fund corporate 
governance scores such as the Morningstar Stewardship Grades is relatively scarce (Li, 
Moshirian, Pham and Zein, 2006, Zhou Ng and Wang, 2011 and Chen and Huang, 2011). 
Hitherto, to the best of our knowledge, the work by Wellman and Zhou (2007) is 
probably the most comprehensive study on the Stewardship Grades.  
 
Using the first release of the Stewardship Grades since August 2004, Wellman 
and Zhou (2007) document that funds with top Stewardship Grade outperform those with 
poor grades by 19 to 23 basis points per month over the period Jan 2001 – July 2004, and 
by 10 to 16 basis points over the period September 2004 – December 2004. Furthermore, 
their study on fund flows pattern reveals that upgrades and downgrades of Stewardship 
Grades lead to positive and negative fund flows respectively. In addition, they find that 
among the five stewardship components, only Fees and Board Quality exhibit significant 
explanatory power, thus demonstrating an indirect relation between corporate governance 
and fund performance. Their work corroborates academic studies that report a positive   5
association between firm valuation and corporate governance scores like the widely used 
G-index (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). 
 
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) find some evidence that better governance is 
associated with fees that are more aligned with fund performance, thus offering a partial 
explanation for the anomaly that funds with worse before-fee performance charge higher 
fees. In a similar spirit, Navone (2011) find that funds with better Board Quality grade is 
associated with less aggressive fees re-pricing by fund companies, although there is no 
evidence that better Board Quality grades translate into lower expense ratio. Zhou and 
Wang (2011) study the role governance plays in mutual fund voting. Their findings 
suggest that funds with good corporate governance, as indicated by their Stewardship 
Grade, tend to act in the interest of their shareholders by voting responsibly for 
governance issues of their portfolio firms and investing only in well-governed firms. 
 
Chen and Huang (2011) employ both OLS regression and quantile regressions to 
examine the contemporaneous relation between fund performance and corporate 
governance using both the overall Stewardship Grades and two stewardship component 
grades – Manager Incentive and Board Quality. While OLS regression reveal a strong 
contemporaneous association between overall Stewardship Grade and fund performance, 
they do not find evidence of any relation between performance and any of the 
stewardship components. However, quantile regressions demonstrate a strong positive 
relation between Manager Incentive and fund performance at the right tail of the 
performance distribution. In addition, Board Quality is found to have a significant ability   6
to predict future performance when quantile regression is used. Along the same vein but 
performing dummy variable OLS regressions, Gottesman and Morey (2012) find no 
evidence that any of the stewardship component can consistently predict future 
performance. Hence among published work, there is at best mixed evidence of the 
effectiveness corporate governance components in performance prediction. 
 
There has been growing interest among academics in using Stewardship Grades 
as a proxy for corporate governance quality to examine the role governance plays in 
various dimensions of fund management. Among the working papers that involve the use 
of Stewardship Grade are Casavecchia and Tooman (2012) and Lai, Tiwari and Zhang 
(2010). The former investigate how governance is associated with managerial herding 
behavior. Their results indicate that a higher manager incentive grade is associated with a 
lower intensity of managerial herding activities. The latter document three key results 
related to board quality of mutual funds. First, they report that for funds in the bottom 
quintile based on past performance, those with a good Board Quality grade suffer 
significantly lower outflows.  Second, they find that for funds with bad boards, a negative 
past performance is strongly predictive of future negative performance. Finally, they 
document that following poor performance, funds with better boards are more likely to 
change their fund strategy compared to funds with bad boards. More recently, Kurniawan, 
How and Verhoeven (2012) explore whether governance matters to fund style drift. Their 
analysis provides evidence that style-drift is negatively related to individual stewardship 
components such as Board Quality, Fees Structure and Regulatory History. Such ongoing   7
interest and work help establish the unmistakable link between governance components 
and better operation of the fund, which consequently leads to performance. 
 
Evidently, the salient factors in corporate governance that affect firm value cannot 
be observed in isolation, in this paper we explore the main drivers controlling for other 
factors. The main objective of our study is to address the dearth of research in possibly 
predictive determinants of mutual fund ratings by investigating how well Stewardship 
Grades can predict future Star Ratings, and hence future fund performance. We address 
potential econometric issues like endogeneity associated with predictive regressions of 
panel data with a Two-stage Least Squares framework, and hence, dynamic panel data 
regressions to capture the feed-back dynamics of the relationship in a more 
comprehensive way. Our findings complement existing studies on the relation between 
mutual fund performance and the performance-based Morningstar Star Ratings, thus 
providing some insights on the extent to which corporate governance of mutual fund 
should be considered by investors in searching for the best performing mutual funds. 
Mutual fund ratings have been widely publicized to, and often used by retail mutual fund 
distributors as a marketing tool for selling mutual funds. Individual investors also use 
ratings as a primary criterion for screening mutual funds. The results of our studies have 
important ramifications for retail investors’ financial well-being. 
 
We follow up with a brief preview of our contribution. In a panel data model, we 
find consistent predictability of US mutual fund performance using both monthly and 
yearly Stewardship Grades after controlling for fund specific characteristics. In the   8
monthly data, we find that Stewardship Grades, while being quite persistent, does indeed 
Granger cause long term performance measures like the Star Rating. 
 
From the yearly panel data, we have several key findings. First, using Principal 
Component Analysis, we propose an effective yet procedure agnostic score based on the 
five components of the Stewardship as the first principal component (Baker and Wurgler, 
2006)
2. Second, employing a naïve fixed effects model, we establish a strong predictive 
relationship between corporate governance and risk adjusted four-factor alpha (besides 
the Star Rating) after adjusting for endogeneity bias due to unobserved fund 
characteristics like managerial ability. Third, with the use of a dynamic panel data model, 
we demonstrate that even in the presence of lagged performance measures, a strong 
relationship between Stewardship Grades and performance holds. Finally, our findings 
lend credence to the view that the Morningstar Stewardship Grades supplement the Star 
Rating as a mutual fund evaluation tool and are particularly effective during crisis periods.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description and 
some statistics of the data we employ. Section 3 presents the methodology we use and 
Section 4 reports our findings. In Subsection 4.1, we explore the out-of-sample 
predictability of performance with the Star Rating and Stewardship. We discuss the 
relationship of short term performance and Stewardship in Subsection 4.2. In Subsection 
                                                 
2 The first principal component that we calculate based on the total variation of the full 79 monthly data is 
FPC=0.35Board Quality+0.65Corporate Culture+0.37Fee Score+0.09Manager incentive+0.55Regulatory 
History. The loadings are almost the same up to second place for 7 yearly December data. We acknowledge 
that there is some level of selection in the data, however, the closeness of the yearly and monthly 
proportions give us enough credibility. The results are a little different after 2007 (not reported here) with 
Board Quality weighted down while Managerial Incentive is increased.   9
4.3, we investigate the predictive panel regressions of the dynamic models. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
 
2 Data 
 
Morningstar provided monthly Star Ratings, including the 3-year, 5-year and 10-
year ratings (whichever available
3) and Stewardship Grades. We further obtained all 
Stewardship Grade components (Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Fees 
Score (FS), Manager Incentive (MI) and Regulatory History (RH), important fund 
information like average and longest manager tenure and various fund classifications, 
over the period November 2004 – May 2011. For simplicity and for subsequent reference, 
we shall enumerate the months as follows: November 2004 is month 1, December 2004 
month 2 and so on, with the last month, May 2011 being Month 79.  
 
We merge the Morningstar data with the Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund database. The CRSP database includes the 
Fama-French-Carhart’s four factors (Carhart (1997)), monthly total returns, monthly total 
net assets, quarterly expenses, quarterly portfolio turnover, date of inception and a ‘Dead 
Fund Flag’ that indicates whether the fund has ceased to exist. We include only funds 
                                                 
3 Funds whose age is 3 – 5 years will receive a 3-year rating; funds with age 5 – 10 years will receive a 5-
year rating; those with age 10 years or longer will receive a 10-year rating. The overall Morningstar rating 
is derived from a weighted sum of these ratings. More details can be found in Morningstar Factsheets on 
Ratings.     10
whose fund identifiers from Morningstar (identifier = ‘Ticker’) and CRSP (Fund 
Identifier = ‘Nasdaq’) databases match. Only three funds are identified as ‘Dead’ fund.  
 
Table 1 displays the frequency distributions of Star R a t i n g s  ( P a n e l  A )  a n d  
Stewardship Grade (Panel B) for the January samples. We select only funds that receive 
both Star Rating and Stewardship Grade over the sample period
4. We observe that only a 
small percentage of funds receive the best and worst mutual find ratings and Stewardship 
Grades. We can also observe an asymmetry in the proportions with the best grades 
proportions outnumbering the worst ones. This phenomenon can be assigned to both the 
selection issue and the non-imposition of a symmetric bell curve structure on the scores. 
For Stewardship Grades, the percentage of funds that receive the top grade of ‘A’ ranges 
from 6.1% to 10.2% compared to 9.66% to 16.46% for top star rate funds. For the worst 
grade of ‘F’, the proportions are 0.8% to 3.69% as compared to 1.93% to 6.7% 1-star 
rated funds. The two-way frequencies for both ratings in Panel C reveals that Star Rating 
and Stewardship Grades are associated with each other for each year (Chi-squared test of 
Contingency Table results not included). 
 
< Insert Table 1 > 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the fund variables that we shall use in 
the empirical part of this paper. Based on Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Asset Class’ , we 
divide the samples into 5 groups, namely balanced funds, bond funds (‘municipal bond’ 
                                                 
4 Choosing only funds that have both Stewardship Grade and Star Rating does entail some level of selection 
bias in the data as only the funds which are widely held, larger and more familiar to the Morningstar 
analysts get Stewardship Grades and only the ones with longer history gets favorable star rating (Lutton et. 
al., 2011, p. 4-5)   11
or ‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’, ‘specialty funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’).  
We notice that an overwhelming number of funds are of US equity type (624) nearly 
twice as much as the next biggest number of bond funds (315). As expected, expense 
ratio is 50% higher for US equity funds than bond funds and the absolute flow is about 
two and a half times more. Average manager tenure is between 6.5 and 7.5 years. The 
turnover ratio for bond funds (1.08) is nearly 50% more than the US equity funds (0.73). 
The monthly logarithm of age and size are comparable through all categories. 
 
< Insert Table 2 > 
 
The methodology for the Stewardship Grades for funds is independent from the 
Morningstar Star Rating for funds and thus should have no impact on a fund’s Star 
Rating, through better governance might make the fund more attractive (Morningstar Fact 
Sheet, 2007). Using the six January samples (2005 to 2011), we compute the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient between contemporaneous the Star Ratings and 
Stewardship Grades. From Table 3 Panel A, in most cases there is at best some weak 
though statistically significant positive correlation between Star Ratings and components 
of the governance measures. The overall Stewardship Grade and Corporate Culture score 
are significantly correlated with the Star Rating for all the six monthly data.  
 
In Table 3 Panel B, we perform Granger causality tests with lag length of 2 on the 
raw scores of ratings from the January samples. For the Star Rating, the raw score can be 
estimated as follows   12
Raw score for Star Rating (SR) = 





  

returns   of   years   10   has   fund   if       SR   2 . 0 SR   3 . 0 SR   0.5
  returns   of   years   10 - 5   has   fund   if                          SR   4 . 0 SR   0.6
returns   of   years   5 - 3   has   fund   if                                                  SR
3 5 10
3 5
3
  
where SRt is the t-year MorningStar Rating. For the Stewardship Grade, the raw score is 
simply the arithmetic average of the cores for the five stewardship component – 
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) 
and Regulatory History (RH) (cf. Morningstar 2007).  
 
We find in monthly data that raw Stewardship Grade and raw Star Rating strongly 
Granger cause each other which suggests there is a long term feedback relationship 
between the two variables. This result however has one caveat as Stewardship Grades are 
quite persistent (possibly non-stationary) and Star Ratings are not (i.e., stationary), hence 
such results could be biased. When we examine the difference series of both the 
Stewardship Grades and the Star Rating, we find no evidence of Granger causality. In an 
ongoing work (Ng and Ghosh, 2012)  and subsequent sections of this paper, we shall 
explore this interesting finding further by using a rigorous long panel data models and 
dealing with asymptotic results on large cross section (large N) and large time series 
(large T). 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
 
3  Methodology for Ranked Portfolio Tests and Regressions 
   13
Of the 24 provisions of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) that 
the G-Index focused on, only 6 provisions forming the subsequent Entrenchment or E-
Index turned out to be the main drivers for firm valuation (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 
2009). Some salient features of the main drivers, and the possibly endogenous control 
variables for corporate governance, deserve a re-evaluation.  
 
First, although opinions are divided whether entrenchment reduces firm value, it 
has been documented that managers of firms with low value are often entrenched, hence 
it is challenging to decipher how much of this entrenchment is causal to the low value of 
the firm (cf. Bebchuk 2002, for a survey). This correlation could be an outcome of the 
simultaneous evolution of firm value and managerial incentives (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
We account for this endogeneity with the Two-stage Least Squares framework applying 
variables like indicators of managerial ability (e.g., tenure) as instruments. These 
instruments are assumed to affect the variable reflecting firm performance (in the current 
context, the shareholders’ risk adjusted return) only through the Stewardship Grade, i.e., 
satisfy the required exclusion restriction for a valid instrument (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 242, 
eq. 9.3). 
 
Second, corporate governance for firms is notoriously sticky or persistent. This 
feature has been effectively used to “fill in” interim yearly data between the irregular 
publications of the IRRC volumes where the governance scores are assumed to 
essentially remain constant (Gompers et al., 2003, Bebchuk et al., 2009). For the current 
paper, we are in a unique position to assess the transitions of the corporate governance   14
scores, both monthly as well as yearly. Hence, with the longer time dimension in the 
longitudinal or panel data, we find strong evidence of the simultaneity between our 
governance score and performance measures using Granger Causality tests. This 
evidence of co-evolution of corporate governance in mutual funds and their 
corresponding performance through different business cycles gives us a remarkable 
insight into their inter-dependence. 
 
Third, in the current context mutual funds are part of financial sector where the 
major component of the firm performance is risk adjusted return rather than the Tobin’s 
Q. However, the components of Stewardship like Managerial Incentive might be pivotal 
in the performance of the mutual fund for its shareholders. We also observe that limits to 
shareholder control according to the IRRC provisions like staggered board might be 
subsumed within Board Quality and Managerial Incentive, while Golden Parachute will 
most likely be linked with Corporate Culture, Managerial Incentive and Fee Score. 
Finally, Regulatory History probably is also related to Board Quality and managerial 
incentive. The other factors not in the E-Index (for example, Director indemnification and 
relevant contracts, Director’s limited liability and severance packages) might also play 
significant roles (Bebchuk et al., 2009, Lutton et al., 2011). This does put us into a 
difficult position to extract the true components of stewardship protection, we delegate 
this responsibility and seek the advantage of aggregating to an objective or data-driven 
Stewardship score. 
   15
Finally, both the G-Index and the subset of drivers for managerial entrenchment 
(or the E-Index) are dependent on the questions, and are constructed previously with 
equal weightage on the constituent questions (Gompers et al., 2003, Bebchuk et al., 2008). 
However, as has been the case, the effectiveness of these questions to elicit corporate 
governance practices has been varying with time. To elucidate this problem, Bebchuk et 
al. (2008) observes:  
 
“…institutional investors deciding which firms to include in their portfolios and 
which governance changes to press for would likely be better served if shareholder 
advisory firms were to use governance measures based on a small number of key 
provisions rather than attempt to count all the trees in the governance forest.” 
 
We propose to use a Principal Component Analysis based methodology that will 
look at the variation of the entire evaluation dataset to determine the adaptive weights on 
the components of Stewardship. This reduces the subjective bias that might be affected 
by recent or more noteworthy events. In a way we can call this proposed method a really 
question agnostic and data dependent framework. 
 
To examine the predictive power of fund ratings, we employ a standard 
methodology in which we study the relation between in-sample ratings of funds with 
their out-of-sample performance, as measured by some standard performance metrics 
over some evaluation period. Our main benchmark is the four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997):    16
it t i4 t i2 t i2 t i1 ft it ε UMD β HML β SMB β RMRF β α R R           
 
which is an extension of the celebrated Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. In 
this model,  t RMRF  is the value of the market return in excess of monthly T-Bill rate (or 
the market risk premium);  t SMB  (small minus big factor) is the difference in returns 
across small and big portfolios (or the size premium);  t HML  (high minus low factor) is 
the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market equity portfolios (or the 
value premium);  t UMD  (monthly momentum factor) is the difference in average returns 
on two high ex-ante return portfolios and two low ex-ante return portfolios (defined as 
the momentum factor or momentum premium).  
 
The SMB factor which is designed to capture the size effect is based on a 
portfolio comprising a long position in a portfolio of small-cap stocks financed by a short 
position in a portfolio of large-cap stocks. The HML factor which is meant to capture the 
book-to-market factor is calculated by building a portfolio that takes a long position in a 
portfolio of high book-to-market (value) stocks and a short position in a portfolio of low 
book-to-market (growth) stocks. The UMD factor, described in Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), is a momentum factor estimated from a portfolio long in high-momentum stocks 
and short in low-momentum stocks.  
 
Following the methodology in Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), we perform a two-
stage procedure to estimate the monthly out-of-sample performance measures of mutual 
funds. In stage 1, for each one-year evaluation period [t – 11, t], we regress each fund’s   17
monthly excess return on the monthly four risk factors over 36 months (that is, month  t – 
35 through month t)  prior to the last month of the evaluation period. In the second stage, 
we add the average residuals over one-year prior to and including month t (that is month t 
– 11 to month t) to the estimated intercept term at month t from stage 1 to get the 
estimated one-year out-of-sample measure.  
 
Our first approach to examining the strength of predictive power of ratings 
consists in forming portfolios by their mutual fund ratings and examining the portfolio 
mean out-of-sample performance over a 12-month evaluation (post-rating) period.   
Specifically, for each month over the period November 2004 (month 1) to May 2010 
(month 67), sample funds are ranked by one or both of the Morningstar Stewardship 
Grades (abbrev. SG)  and/or Morningstar Star Ratings (abbrev SR) and the difference in 
mean four-factor alpha for funds in any two groups is observed. A Newey-West robust  t-
test is then performed on the time series of differences.  
 
Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 1 or 2 is in the bottom SR (respectively SG) 
group. Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 5 is in the top SR (respectively SG) group. The 
remaining finds are placed in the middle rating group. Funds in the top SG*SR group are 
those in both top SR and top SG groups. Similarly, funds in the bottom SG*SR group are 
those in both bottom SR and bottom SG groups. The remaining funds are placed in the 
middle SG*SR group. Similar criteria apply to the five Stewardship Grade components - 
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) 
and Regulatory History (RH).    18
 
As we seek to find a linear sum of the five stewardship components that possibly 
possesses a stronger predictive power than the overall Stewardship Grade, we employ the 
Principal Component Analysis on the time series of stewardship components to construct 
a new corporate governance score which we name the First Principal Component (FPC). 
Funds are sorted by their FPC and divided into three portfolios - approximately 30% in 
each of the top and bottom groups and the remaining 40% in the middle group.  The next 
step is to compute, for each rating, the difference in mean out-of-sample return of 
portfolio. This produces a time series (from month 1 to month 67) of difference in returns 
between groups 1 and 2, 2 and 3 and 1 and 3. We use the symbols 2_1, 3_2 and 3_1 to 
denote these differences. 
 
  Another standard way to assess predictability of ratings is to run a regression of 
out-of-sample return on rating dummies. Blake and Morey (2000) perform a cross-
sectional dummy-variable regression of the form  
Sit =   b 
T d +  eit   
where Sit (in %) is the out-of-sample performance measure of fund i at time t and d is a 
vector of rating-based binary dummy variables. In their model, d = (d1, d2, d3, d4 ) is a 
vector of binary response variables with dk = 1 if a fund has a Morningstar Star Rating of 
k-star. The best rating group (5-star) is used as the control group. Under the hypothesis 
that rating is predictive, the following condition on the estimated regression coefficients 
of dk hold: 
b1 < b2 < b3 < b4 < 0. 
In this study, we consider the following specification   19
Sit =   b 
T d + c 
T x + eit . 
 
Our regression model differs from the preceding in several ways. First, we use the raw 
scores of ratings instead of dummy variables. We estimate different regression 
specifications in which different ratings, including the Star Rating, the overall 
Stewardship Grade, the five stewardship component grades and the First Principal 
Component grade, are used. Second, we include x, a vector of control variables that are 
found in the literature to be potential determinants of fund performance.  
 
We are mindful that any results on predictability could be driven by factors such 
as fund size and fund age. Control variables in x include prior one year expense ratio and 
turnover ratio reported in the CRSP mutual fund database, prior one month absolute fund 
flow defined as TNAt – (1 + Ri,t-1)TNAt-1 (TNAt and Rt being the total net assets and total 
monthly return provided by CRSP), prior one month natural logarithm of net asset, prior 
one month natural logarithm of fund age (in months), prior one year average manager 
tenure and time dummy variables.  
 
Third, instead of treating our data as cross-sectional data at different observation 
time, we perform panel data regressions which is known to be more informative than its 
cross-sectional counterparts. We have a unique dataset that provides us with monthly 
values of the overall Stewardship Grade and the five component grades, hence we are 
able to use standard panel data models. Our panel methods help us identify the effect that 
Stewardship Grades as well as the individual components have on standard risk-adjusted   20
returns such as the four factor alpha (Carhart, 1997) or  a longer-term performance 
measure like Morningstar Star Rating.  
 
Finally, for the sake of ensuring the robustness of our results and addressing the 
issue of potential endogeneity, we employ static fixed effect regression, two-stage least 
square regression and dynamic panel regressions with instrumental variables. For a 
detailed description of these regression models we refer to Wooldridge (2010). 
 
  We repeat the same analysis on our study of the relationship between the two 
Morningstar ratings by regressing Star Ratings on the Stewardship Grade or its 
component grades. As we are dealing with the time series of ratings that are not 
necessarily stationary, especially the Stewardship Grade or its component grade as we 
have observed from the data, we perform unit root tests on both series using their raw 
scores. As expected, while there is no evidence that the Star Rating is non-stationary, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the Stewardship Grade is non-stationary using panel unit 
root tests (see Baltagi, 2008). In fact, when we further test for stationarity of the first 
order difference of the Stewardship score time series, we find that the Stewardship score 
is not distinguishable from a I(1) or non-stationary process.
5  
 
In 2007, Morningstar implemented the following methodology changes to the 
Stewardship Grades: 
                                                 
5 These panel unit root tests on monthly data however are based on the assumption that the Stewardship 
Grade is updated as soon as there are any changes in the governance structure. As these grades are followed 
by Morningstar analysts and a report written at least once every year, we cannot be certain of this 
hypothesis (Lutton et. al., 2011). We have ongoing research where we pursue the persistence of the 
Stewardship Grade and its implication on the performance grade relationship (Ng and Ghosh, 2012)   21
1.  The weighting on Corporate Culture is increased from 2 to 4 (out of 10) 
2.  The requirement that independent directors make up 75% of the board be 
mandatory. 
3.  Regulatory history score is changed from a scale of 0- 2 to -2 to 0.  
We refer the reader to Lutton et. al. (2011) for more details. In view of the above changes, 
we repeat every regression by restricting the sample to data that corresponds to the period 
January 2007 through May 2011.  
 
We acknowledge the fact that monthly Stewardship Grades might not be updated 
regularly. There is a significant chance that any changes in ratings are probably related to 
the time at which Morningstar team evaluates the component Stewardship scores from 
both direct and indirect sources (Lutton et al., 2011). We also observe a strong 
persistence of Stewardship Grades vis-à-vis the performance measures. We intend to 
address this issue in this paper and a follow-up work on persistence (Ng and Ghosh, 
2012).  
 
4  Results on Performance Predictability of Star Rating and Stewardship 
Grade 
 
4.1 Out-of-sample  Predictability 
 
Table 4 presents the results of our statistical tests of the difference in out-of-
sample performance of portfolio of funds in different rating groups. Applying the Newey-  22
West robust t-test on these time series we can infer that the Star Rating is the best 
predictor of performance, demonstrating a significant and monotonic relation between 
rating and return. In contrast, neither the overall Stewardship Grade nor any of its 
constituent grade exhibits the same extent of predictability after controlling for Star 
Rating. In fact, in many cases, funds from a better rating portfolio underperform. Results 
for Board Quality (difference 3_2) and Fee Score (2_1) are examples of such occurrences. 
Although the joint rating SR*SG indicate the desired positive rating-return relation, the 
result lacks statistical significance. Nonetheless, the First Principal Component yields a 
significant and positive results for 2_1 and 3_2.  
 
Furthermore, once classified by their First Principal Component (FPC) score, the 
mean monthly out-of-sample performance measured by the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
alpha between the middle and top groups, is significantly affected by the Star Rating. The 
only other factors important among the components are the Fee Structure (negative) and 
Manager Incentive (positive), that are both intuitive. For the difference between the top 
and the middle groups, we also find the Star Rating playing a significant positive role, 
and so does Corporate Culture. We however find that Board Quality plays a significant 
negative role while Fee Score plays a significant but positive role. These last two results 
are counter-intuitive as better boards are expected to have a positive impact on 
performance while higher fees would have made the funds less profitable. Finally, 
comparing the top and the bottom groups by Star Rating, the FPC and the interaction 
between the two, we report that individually as well as jointly, the Star Rating and the   23
FPC score play an important and positive role in the difference in four factor alpha 
between the highest and lowest governance groups.  
 
Overall, we can infer that in the presence of the standard Stewardship Grade, our 
proposed FPC measure, while being objective, seems to be doing a better job in 
predicting the difference in out-of-sample four factor alpha together with the Star Rating.  
<Insert Table 4> 
 
4.2 Predictive Panel Regressions of Short term Performance and Stewardship 
 
Predictive performance analysis in Section 4.1 indicates that Morningstar Star 
Rating does have a strong impact on the out-of-sample predictability of the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor alpha when grouped by the First Principal Component (FPC) scores. 
Furthermore, as we observed in Subsection 4.1, the FPC score also plays a significant 
role in determination of both the out-of-sample performance and the effectiveness of the 
Star Rating. We would first perform predictive panel regressions on the various 
performance measures including the four-factor alpha, a monthly or yearly performance 
measure, followed by the Star Rating which is a weighted long term risk-adjusted 
performance measure. 
 
We perform different specifications of the predictive panel data regression models. 
We first estimate the standard fixed effect model for the yearly data (collected in 
December, 2005-2011) assuming strict exogeneity of the regressors in Specification EX   24
(Table 5, Panel A, Model Spec EX) (Wooldridge, 2010). In model (SR_EX), we find that 
the four-factor alpha is well explained by the Star Rating. We further observe that size 
plays a significant negative role, consistent with the story that bigger funds can water 
down returns (Berk and Green, 2004). However, for the fixed effect (FE) regression 
models with just the Stewardship Grade (SG_EX) and the First Principal Component 
(FPC_EX), neither the Stewardship Grade (SG) nor the First Principal Component (FPC) 
are have a significant impact on short-term performance. In both models (SG_EX) and 
(FPC_EX), size seems to play a positive and significant role in determining short-term 
performance as opposed to the specification (SR_EX). Age, on the other hand, shows a 
negative but statistically insignificant association with short term performance. The main 
reason for the insignificance of the SG and FPC scores in the models (SG_EX) and 
(FPC_EX) is possibly attributed to the violation of the strict exogeneity assumption in 
these models which makes the coefficient estimates inconsistent. 
 
To address the problem of endogeneity we use two stage least squares estimators 
in the predictive panel regression setting in Table 5 Panel A (Specification EN). The 
instruments used for the static two stage least squares specification includes lagged 
values of the average tenure of the manager, the longest tenure of the manager, the 
turnover ratio, the expense ratio and the absolute flow variable. These instruments are 
correlated with the Stewardship or FPC scores, and hence to the Star Rating. Furthermore, 
these instruments only affect the four-factor alpha (or the dependent variable) through the 
explanatory variables satisfying the exclusion restriction (or  exogeneity) or valid   25
instruments. We have also included the included explanatory variables size and age as 
instruments to make sure that the necessary rank condition is satisfied.  
 
From model (SR_EN), we observe that the lagged Star Rating does continue to 
have a positive impact on the four-factor alpha and size has a negative and significant 
effect, consistent with findings in Berk and Green (2004) and Bebchuk et. al. (2009). 
Compared to the preceding model, we find that the Stewardship has a significantly 
positive relation with four-factor alpha in model (SG_EN). In addition, we find once 
again that fund size has a significantly negative effect on performance. The same results 
are echoed when we replace Stewardship score with the First Principal Component in 
model (FPC_EN).   
 
With a predictive panel data model, we can exploit the dynamic behavior and 
possibly inter-relationship between the lagged four-factor alpha as a covariate as well. 
However, given only 6 years of data after accommodating for the year lost for 
constructing the four-factor alpha, the results are expected to be weak at best. Even then, 
we find that in the overall model (SGA_DY) after controlling for the lagged dependent 
variable or lagged four-factor alpha, fund size continues to exhibit a significantly 
negative relation with performance. This result holds across all the regression 
specifications analysed. Surprisingly, we also find that Corporate Culture too plays a 
significantly negative role in predicting performance. One possible explanation for this 
anomaly is that after controlling for past performance (in terms of lagged alpha), 
Corporate Culture seems to create possible managerial entrenchment and generate a   26
negative effect (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, Ding and Wermers, 2009, Bebchuck 
and Cohen, 2004, Bebchuk et al., 2009). This finding is also highlighted by a significant 
negative effect on fund size (Berk and Green, 2004). We also observe that lagged four-
factor alpha tends to have a negative impact on future alpha after controlling for other 
covariates. Although this effect is economically significant in all four dynamic models, it 
is only statistically significant in Model (SR_DY) with the Star Rating. Finally, we 
conclude from models (SG_DY) and (FPC_DY) that neither the Stewardship score nor 
FPC score have a significant positive impact on performance after controlling for lagged 
four-factor alpha. 
 
Since the methodology for Stewardship Grade was revamped substantially in 
2007, we re-estimate all the regression models using data over the period on and after 
2007. Both under strict exogeneity (Models EX) and incorporating endoeneity (Models 
EN), results in Panel B are qualitatively the same as those in Panel A for the full sample. 
The former again indicates no statistical significance between corporate governance score 
(SG or FPC) and future returns while the latter yields the same strong significance of 
both SG and FPC scores in predicting four-factor alpha. 
<Insert Table 5> 
 
4.3 Predictive Panel Regressions of Long term Performance and Stewardship 
 
  The main objective of pursuing good governance is to ensure a long-term and 
sustainable performance. This brings us to the search of an appropriate measure of   27
performance. While the four-factor alpha suffices to be a short term measure of mutual 
fund performance, its single (monthly or yearly) horizon does not make it a more viable 
measure for long term objectives. There are a few reasons for this premise. First, an 
accurate evaluation of the four-factor alpha substantially reduces the data series, 
particularly for a yearly data in which only a few years of Stewardship Grades are 
availability. Second, it is fairly well accepted now that good mutual fund performance (or 
“hot hands”) is not very persistent (Hendricks et al., 1993, Goetzman et al., 1994, Brown 
et al., 1995). Consequently, using a yearly measure generates a “bounce” which might 
deviate from longer run objectives. Third, it is not clear how risk adjusted returns of 
different time horizons may be combined into a consolidated long term performance 
measure, making it a challenge to reach a consensus on the use of such a measure. Finally, 
published ratings data from sources like Morningstar are more readily available to and 
trusted by individual investors than model-based risk adjusted returns. Taking all of these 
into account, a weighted measure of risk adjusted returns of different durations like the 
Star Rating have gained tremendous popularity among both academics and practitioners 
(Blake and Morey,  2000, Wellman and Zhou, 2007, Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008). 
 
 Hence, with a long term investment objective in mind, we prefer to analyze the 
raw Star Rating measure with respect to a corporate governance score and other control 
variables in a predictive panel data setting. Table 6 Panel A, Specification EX uses the 
assumption of strict exogeneity in the Fixed Effect panel data model. We observe that in 
Model (SGA_EX) all the components of the Stewardship score except Manager Incentive 
(MI) are statistically significant, and so are the controls average manager tenure and   28
longest manager tenure (measures of stability), size and age (measures of maturity). We 
do, however, find that while size has a positive impact on Star Rating, age shows a 
significant negative impact. This dichotomy is persistent for models (SG_EX) and 
(FPC_EX) where we use the Stewardship Grade and the FPC score respectively 
consistent with findings in Bebchuk et. al. (2009).  
 
In Table 6 Panel B models of specification EX for data on or after 2007, we also 
find a positive effect of average manager tenure being higher, and a slight negative effect 
(in Model SGA_EX) of the longest manager tenure. This last result could be real (say, 
previously discussed managerial entrenchment, as documented in Brown et al., 1996, 
Ding and Wermers, 2009) or an artifact of the possible endogeneity in the model. It is 
also possible that the high collinearity between age and size is causing some anomalies. 
 
To address the possible endogeneity issue that can make the estimated 
coefficients inconsistent, we use two stage last squares on more parsimonious models 
described in Table 6 Panel A (Specifications EN). Instruments used are lagged values of 
stewardship scores, average and longest manager tenure, log(age), expense ratio, 
log(size), turnover ratio and fund flows. The included variables are Stewardship scores 
components (Model SGA_EN), the Stewardship score itself (Model SG_EN) or the FPC 
score (Model FPC_EN). In model (SGA_EN) we observe, among the components Fee 
Score has a significant negative effect on Star Rating while others are all positive and 
significant. We also estimate that size and turnover ratio would have a positive impact on 
Star Rating. Unlike the short term performance measure, size having a positive impact on   29
Star Rating or weighted long term performance is more reasonable as the bigger funds 
tend to have better Star Rating which also adds to its size. We should also note that funds 
that are selected by Morningstar to receive the Stewardship Grade tend to be those with a 
larger assets (Lutton et al., 2011). 
 
In Model SG_EN, both Stewardship Grade and turnover ratio have a positive and 
significant impact on Star Rating. However, size had an economically significant but 
statistically insignificant negative coefficient for the full sample. We can reconcile the 
somewhat counter-intuitive result on turnover by noting that Star Rating is a long-term 
measure of past performance which might not be affected by recent active portfolio 
management.  Besides, the relationship between portfolio turnover and fund performance 
has been a controversial issue. For example, both Carhart (1997) and Malkiel (1995) 
document a negative association between fund performance and turnover. But results 
from Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and Wermers (2000) report a positive relation between 
performance and turnover, thus suggesting that active trading can be positive for fund 
performance (for an international perspective, see Rao, 2010). 
 
In the dynamic panel data model for yearly data (Table 6 Panel A Specification 
DY), we find that both size and past Star Rating play a significant positive role in all 
models (SGA_DY, SG_DY and FPC_DY). We also observe that size play a significant 
positive role. In model (SGA_DY), both the Stewardship Grade in model (SG_DY) and 
the FPC in model (FPC_DY) are significantly and positively associated with Star Rating 
when we control for past Star Ratings. Considering that we are using only six years of   30
data, this result further corroborates our view of the inherent long- term relationship 
between Star Rating and corporate governance of the mutual funds. 
 
Results in Table 6 Panel B Specifications EX and EN, which are based on data 
taken on or after 2007 (the year when there was a major revamp of the Stewardship 
Grades methodology), are qualitatively the same as those reported in Panel A on the 
whole. One notable difference is that size becomes negative and significant for Model 
(SG_EN), which supports the hypothesis of Berk and Green (2004) predictions. 
 
As annual reports and financial statements are released once a year, we cannot 
expect the components of Stewardship Grades to change more frequently than that. 
However, as we have a wide cross section and different funds have different dates of 
release of financial statements and quarterly updates, we can assume that some variation 
in the monthly data on Stewardship Grades exists despite its persistence. With the 
variation of the Star Rating per month, and its dependence on the current Stewardship 
scores, it is worthwhile to explore the structural dependence of the two measures in the 
monthly panel. Furthermore, due to the availability of a longer monthly series, our 
analysis can also focus on co-evolution of the two processes controlling for other factors.  
 
In the standard time fixed effects model with strict exogeneity reported in Table 6 
Panel C Specification EX, we find that all the Stewardship components are significant 
with Fee Score having a negative coefficient. The other variables that are significant 
positive effect include lagged values of turnover, size, manager tenure average and   31
absolute flow. We also observe that the FPC score has a significant positive impact on 
Star Rating when controlled for fund characteristics, of which only expense ratio shows a 
significantly negative impact.  
 
To address non-exogeneity of the explanatory variables we employ the two stage 
least squares techniques for panels with instruments given by two lagged dependent 
variable and lagged values of average manager tenure, longest manager tenure, turnover 
ratio, expense ratio, log of size, fund flows and a dummy for 2007 or after. In Model 
(SGA_EN) we find that both Fee Scores and regulatory history has negative and 
significant coefficients. Turn-over ratio is insignificant, and size has a positive impact. 
Interestingly, when we replace individual stewardship component grades with the FPC 
score, the coefficient of turnover turns positive and significant. Further, turnover is small 
positive but size has a negative and significant coefficients. Similar results follow for the 
Stewardship Grades which corroborates findings on effect on the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 
2009). 
 
One exciting part about the monthly data is that the number of observations on 
time domain is sufficiently large to do a complete analysis of the time series in the panel 
context. For the Model (SGA_DY), all coefficients of the stewardship components were 
significant and Fee Score turns out to be the only one with a negative coefficient. We also 
find that although lagged size is positive, lagged age has a strong negative impact on Star 
Rating consistently for all three dynamic models. In addition, we also find that being in 
financial crisis year (2008) was significantly negative for the Star Rating. In examining   32
the shorter sample series from January 2007 to May 2011 (Table 6 Panel D) using static, 
endogenous and dynamic models, we find similar results.  
 
Our proposed objective or data-driven First Principal Component (FPC) score 
reduces the dimensionality problem and shows a strong positive significance in models 
with the more subjective Stewardship score (Table 6 Panel D Models FPC_EX and 
SG_EX). We also find a consistently positive effect of turnover, size, average manager 
tenure and absolute flow, and a negative effect of expense ratio. 
 
In our naïve models where we treat the fund specific variables as exogenous, we 
are assuming that these variables have a direct impact on the dependent variable: Star 
Rating. However, we can always argue that these variables are affecting the Star Rating 
through some other variables like the Stewardship. Hence, it might be more meaningful 
to include variables that are associated with stability (manager tenure), cost of running 
the fund (expense ratio) and reputational impact (fund flow) as instruments on direct 
variables like fund size and turnover ratio. Our two stage least squares on the subsample 
after 2007 shows significant negative impact of size (consistent with Berk and Green, 
2004) while maintaining a positive impact on the Stewardship variable. However, 
turnover appears to assert a positive impact on Star Rating when composite Stewardship 
variable (SG or FPC)) rather than individual components is used.  
 
With the monthly panel from 2007, we can apply the Arrelano and Bond (1991) 
methodology to evaluate the effect of differences in the Stewardship components and   33
composite indices on the Star Rating without facing a dimensionality problem caused by 
a short time dimension. We see from Table 6, Panel D model (SGA_DY) that controlling 
for lagged raw Star Rating score, turnover, size and age, the entire set of stewardship 
components are significant. Except for Fee Structure, all coefficients are positive. Lagged 
age seems to have a negative significant impact on Star Rating controlling for the 
difference of funds fixed effects. 
 
 Considering that Stewardship components are persistent, we proceed to explore 
whether changes in Stewardship could be more informative. It turns out that with the 
exception of Corporate Culture, the first order difference of all stewardship component 
scores have a negative and significant impact, controlling for past rating, size, age and 
turnover (Model DSGA_DY). Similar analysis with our proposed FPC score reveals that 
while the lagged FPC as expected has a positive and significant impact on Star Rating, 
the lagged first difference of FPC has a negative significant effect after controlling for 
lagged Star Rating, turnover, age and size (Models FPC_DY and DFPC_DY). We further 
observe that other than turnover ratio which continues having positive effect, variables 
like size, age and the indicator for the crisis period all have a significant negative impact 
on Star Rating. These results are more or less echoed in the results based on models 
(SG_DY) and (DSG_DY).  
 
We reckon that due to strong persistence of the corporate governance structure, 
any changes in these ratings are taken to be highly informative to the investing public and 
the effect gets reflected heavily in long term investment while controlling for past Star   34
Rating. Hence, as opposed to the stock variable reflected in the stewardship score itself, 
changes in the score might communicate past problems in management and induce a 
negative overreaction. 
 
To check for persistence in the Star Rating, we use two lags of the Star Rating 
(Model FPC_DY2). Our results suggest that the Star Rating has a lasting effect. As 
expected, size, age and crisis period have significant negative impact on Star Rating 
while turnover ratio shows a positive relation. 
 
 
 5 Conclusions 
 
According to the 2012 Investment Company Factbook, ownership of mutual 
funds by U.S. households hit 44% in year 2011 compared with less than 6% two decades 
ago. As of the end of 2011, the number of mutual funds in the U.S. market exceeded 
19000 while the number of mutual funds available worldwide was close to 73000. Given 
the multitudes of funds that small institutional investors and retail investors have to 
choose from, they often rely on mutual fund ratings like the Morningstar Star Rating to 
guide their investment decision. This throws us back to the long standing problem of 
evaluating future unobserved performance based on past performance, a practice which 
can be detrimental to the long-term financial well-being of investors.  
   35
The objective of this paper is simple, and really two-fold. First, we evaluate the 
predictability of performance after controlling for other factors. Second, we 
comprehensively uncover the relationship of performance, both short-term (like a risk 
adjusted performance measure like the Carhart’s four factor alpha) and long-term (like 
Morningstar Star Rating), with some non-return-based performance measures related to 
the specific funds.  
 
  Stewardship Grades have been given by Morningstar since November 2004 to 
provide investor with an indication of how well a mutual fund performs its fiduciary 
duties. The evidence of the link between good corporate governance and performance 
have been ephemeral at best. In this paper, we evaluate and ascertain this linkage for 
mutual funds, and hence, give a simple alternative to the recombination of individual 
Stewardship scores to an objective measure that could have implications on long-term 
performance. 
 
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first rigorous attempt to examine 
two popular and influential strands of research on mutual fund ratings – Morningstar’s 
Star Rating and Stewardship Grade – in a comprehensive and econometrically robust 
manner. To examine the predictive power of the ratings, we conduct a ranked portfolio 
test and predictive panel regressions for both monthly and annual data.  
 
Our investigations lead to several key findings. First, all our empirical results 
unequivocally indicate that a good Star Rating is associated with good one-year post-  36
rating risk-adjusted return. Second, we further show that after adjusting for endogeneity 
using a two stage least squares approach, we find a strong and unmistakable link between 
Stewardship score or our proposed FPC score, and separately for both short term (four 
factor alpha) and long term performance (Star Rating) measures. Third, using a dynamic 
panel model, we evaluate how a corporate governance score such as the Stewardship 
Grade, is still strongly and positively significant in the presence of past Star Ratings. This 
substantiates the link claimed between governance and performance for mutual funds. 
Finally, we explore the implications for investors, both institutional and retail, in 
evaluating mutual funds with other factors like size, age, manager tenure, flow, expense 
ratio and turnover. 
 
Summarizing, we find some evidence that a new fiduciary grade based on 
principal component analysis of the component grades possesses a stronger predictive 
power than the Stewardship Grade itself. This suggests that a more informative and 
reliable corporate governance rating can be obtained by putting weightings on the 
individual stewardship components based on Principal Components Analysis. In our 
study on the relation between the two ratings, we find that strong Granger causality exists 
between the two ratings. This relation holds even when we control for all potential 
determinants. To avoid spurious regression, we perform unit root tests on the time series 
of both ratings to ascertain that not both series are non-stationary. It turns out that the Star 
Rating is a stationary process while the Stewardship Grade cannot be proven to be 
stationary. However, the difference series do not Granger cause each other. 
   37
With an increasing awareness of the importance of corporate governance, 
investors are likely to include governance quality as one of their criteria for screening 
mutual funds. Given the popularity of the Morningstar Star Ratings, the Stewardship 
score (or better still, the proposed FPC score) has the potential of becoming a standard 
tool for fund selection, just like the Star Ratings. This study helps provide investors with 
some useful insights into the relation of two seemingly unrelated ratings. Moreover, our 
findings complement existing work on the predictive ability of mutual fund ratings and 
persistence of mutual fund performance. We acknowledge that our analyses are subject to 
some limitations such as the use of raw scores as continuous variables and the short 
duration of our data set, although this is the longest one analyzed in the literature. 
Nonetheless, we hope our application of appropriate econometric techniques can help to 
instigate further research on the efficacy of mutual fund ratings by using of more robust 
methods that can better handle panel data involving ordinal variables such as the 
Stewardship scores. 
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TABLE 1 
Frequency Distribution of Morningstar Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A. Frequency Table of Morningstar Ratings For January Sample of Year 2004 – 2010  
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Morningstar Star Ratings (1-
star (Worst) to 5-star(Best)) awarded in the month of January for year 2005 - 2011. Numbers in 
(      ) indicate percentages. 
 
Star Rating 
Year  1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star N 
2005  16  (1.93)  113  (13.68)  285  (34.5)  276  (33.41)  136  (16.46)  826 
2006  19  (2.04)  155  (16.66)  328  (35.26)  302  (32.47)  126  (13.54)  930 
2007  34  (3.24)  177  (16.87)  376  (35.84)  330  (31.45)  132  (12.58)  1049 
2008  30  (3.13)  185  (19.35)  340  (35.56)  292  (30.54)  109  (11.4)  956 
2009  57  (6.58)  177  (20.46)  326  (37.68)  208  (24.04)  97  (11.21)  865 
2010  44  (5.45)  169  (20.94)  294  (36.43)  222  (27.5)  78  (9.66)  807 
2011  58  (6.7)  162  (18.72)  326  (37.68)  224  (25.89)  95  (10.98)  865 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Panel B. Frequency Table of Stewardship Grades For January sample of Year 2004 – 2010 
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Stewardship Grades (F (Worst) 
to A(Best)) awarded in the month of January for year 2005 - 2011. Numbers in (      ) indicate 
percentages. 
 
 Stewardship  Grade   
Year F  D  C  B  A  N 
2005  30  (3.63)  90  (10.89)  230  (27.84)  408  (49.39)  68  (8.23)  826 
2006  19  (2.04)  80  (8.6)  285  (30.64)  459  (49.35)  87  (9.35)  930 
2007  10  (0.95)  86  (8.19)  348  (33.17)  498  (47.47)  107  (10.2)  1049 
2008  30  (3.13)  195  (20.39)  441  (46.12)  230  (24.05)  60  (6.27)  956 
2009  32  (3.69)  157  (18.15)  427  (49.36)  196  (22.65)  53  (6.12)  865 
2010  25  (3.09)  118  (14.62)  391  (48.45)  200  (24.78)  73  (9.04)  807 
2011  7  (0.8)  142  (16.41)  407  (47.05)  238  (27.51)  71  (8.2)  865 
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Panel C. Two-way Frequency Table of Stewardship Grades and Star Ratings For January 
Sample of Year 2004 – 2010 
This panel reports the two-way frequencies for Stewardship Grades and Star Ratings received by 
funds as of month of January for year 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011. Numbers in (      ) indicate 
percentages. (We omit results for 2006, 2008 and 2010 due to conserve space) 
     Star  Rating 
Year N 
Stewardship 
Grade 1-star 2-star  3-star  4-star  5-star 
2005  826  F  1  (0.12)  3  (0.36)  18  (2.17)  5  (0.6)  3  (0.36) 
    D  0  16  (1.93)  43  (5.2)  20  (2.42)  8  (0.96) 
    C  8  (0.96)  52  (6.29)  93  (11.25)  60  (7.26)  17  (2.05) 
    B  4  (0.48)  37  (4.47)  116  (14.04)  165  (19.97)  86  (10.41) 
    A  0  5  (0.6)  15  (1.81)  26  (3.14)  22  (2.66) 
             
             
2007  1049  F  0  6  (0.57)  1  (0.09)  3  (0.28)  0 
    D  5  (0.47)  24  (2.28)  38  (3.62)  17  (1.62)  2  (0.19) 
    C  17  (1.62)  91  (8.67)  136  (12.96)  74  (7.05)  30  (2.85) 
    B  11  (1.04)  46  (4.38)  167  (15.91)  192  (18.3)  82  (7.81) 
    A  1  (0.09)  10  (0.95)  34  (3.24)  44  (4.19)  18  (1.71) 
             
2009  865  F  4  (0.46)  7  (0.8)  12  (1.38)  7  (0.8)  2  (0.23) 
    D  16  (1.84)  44  (5.08)  64  (7.39)  25  (2.89)  8  (0.92) 
    C  25  (2.89)  93  (10.75)  164  (18.95)  99  (11.44)  46  (5.31) 
    B  11  (1.27)  23  (2.65)  67  (7.74)  65  (7.51)  30  (3.46) 
    A  1  (0.11)  10  (1.15)  19  (2.19)  12  (1.38)  11  (1.27) 
             
             
2011  865  F  0  1  (0.11)  2  (0.23)  1  (0.11)  3  (0.34) 
    D  19  (2.19)  35  (4.04)  49  (5.66)  25  (2.89)  14  (1.61) 
    C  29  (3.35)  87  (10.05)  160  (18.49)  97  (11.21)  34  (3.93) 
    B  10  (1.15)  32  (3.69)  87  (10.05)  74  (8.55)  35  (4.04) 
    A  0  7  (0.8)  28  (3.23)  27  (3.12)  9  (1.04) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Fund Variables 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of important fund variables used in this study. The sample consisting of funds classified as ‘U.S. Stock’ , ‘International Stock’ , 
‘Specialty’, ‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and ‘Balanced’ funds under Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ Classification)  receive Stewardship Grades 
(abbrev. SG) (including each of the five stewardship components) and the Star Ratings (Abbrev SR) in December 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 November 2004 – 
May 2011. We report the time series averages of the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation and number of funds. 
 
 
 
  Balanced Funds    Bond Funds    International Stock Funds    Specialty Funds    U.S. Stock Funds 
 Variables  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  N     Mean  Standard 
Deviation  N     Mean  Standard 
Deviation  N     Mean  Standard 
Deviation  N     Mean  Standard 
Deviation  N 
log(age in mth)  5.3683028  0.62896  110  5.3795497 0.4481573 315  5.0461288 0.4293019 213   5.2275886 0.4729978 13  5.2097018  0.572526 624 
Expense Ratio  0.0082924 0.004902 110  0.0074303 0.0034062 315  0.0128939 0.0046383 213   0.0122945  0.005503  13   0.011109  0.0041892 624 
Absolute  Fund 
Flows (in mil)  12.294297 340.05229 110  3.0699238 277.36565 315 25.69938 543.22362 212 -2.5657789 28.742031 13
-
7.3041424 229.12717 621 
Average Manager 
Tenure  6.5833509 4.9476213 107  7.5845307 5.4972827 315  6.2438162 3.9192516 213   7.9215385 4.5290633 13  7.5198852 5.3072304 624 
Turnover ratio  0.6644566 0.6046284 110  1.0801076  1.7108  315  0.6601213 0.7053254 213   0.6153846 0.6746283 13  0.7302717  0.604028 624 
log(size in mil)  6.9439451 1.736499 110  6.6895591 1.3812719 315  6.6019083 1.7866403 213   6.4433435 1.0001594 13  6.5346641 1.6467225 624 
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Table 3 
Correlation and Granger Causality Relation Between Star Rating and 
Stewardship Grades 
Panel A   Correlation of Star Rating with Stewardship Grade and its Components  
This table reports the correlation between the Star Rating and the Stewardship Grade (SG) and each of the 
Stewardship Grade components - Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ) ,  Manager Incentives (MI), Fees 
Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH)  for the January sample of  2005 , 2007, 2009  and  2011 (we omit 
results for 2006, 2008 and 2010  to conserve space) 
 
January 2005 
(N=826)  
January 2007 
(N=1049)  
January  2009 
(N=865)  
January 2011 
(N=865) 
SG 0.27183    0.28052 0.19043   0.17891
  (< 0.01)    (< 0.01)    (< 0.01)    (< 0.01) 
BQ 0.23148    0.25559    0.04808    0.0048 
 (<  0.01)    (<  0.01)    (0.1578)    (0.8879) 
FS 0.17368    0.1345    0.05052    -0.01846 
 (<  0.01)    (<  0.01)    (0.1377)    (0.5877) 
MI 0.04744    0.01121    0.11455    0.20896 
  (0.1732)    (0.7170) (< 0.01)   (< 0.01)
CC 0.2898    0.30522    0.17222    0.21621 
  (< 0.01)    (< 0.01)    (< 0.01)    (< 0.01) 
RH 0.19754    0.22287    0.16411    -0.01057 
 (<  0.01)    (<  0.01)   (<  0.01)    (0.7564) 
  
Panel B   Pairwise Granger Causality Test on raw scores of Star Rating (SR) and Stewardship Grade (SG) 
This table reports the F-statistics and p-value (in parentheses) of Pairwise Granger causality test (lag length 2) 
between Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades or  individual stewardship component grade using monthly time 
series data from the January 2005 – January 2011. 
Variable  SR GC Variable  Variable GC SR 
SG 10.0908***  9.5923*** 
  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
BQ   0.97223   4.91146*** 
  (0.3782)  (< 0.01) 
CC   18.2667***   6.67852*** 
  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
FS   1.63902   2.19359 
  (0.1942) (0.1115) 
MI   13.5747***   0.51167 
 (<  0.01)  (0.5995) 
RH   2.57021   8.99095*** 
  (0.0765)  (< 0.01) 
    49
 
Table 4 
This table reports results for statistical tests for difference in mean monthly out-of-sample performance measure in the top and bottom rating groups. For each month over the 
period November 2004 (month 1) to May 2010 (month 67), sample funds are ranked by one or both of the Morningstar Stewardship Grades (abbrev. SG)  and/or Morningstar 
Star Ratings (abbrev SR) and the difference in mean four-factor alpha for funds in any two groups is observed. A Newey-West adjusted t-test is performed on the time series 
of differences. Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 1 or 2 is in the bottom SR (respectively SG) group. Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 5 is in the top SR (respectively SG) 
group. The remaining funds are placed in the middle rating group. Funds in the top SGSR group are those in both top SR and top SG groups. Similarly, funds in the bottom 
SG*SR group are those in both bottom SR and bottom SG groups. The remaining funds are placed in the middle SG*SR group. Similar criteria apply to the five Stewardship 
Grade components - Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ) ,  Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH). For the First Principal 
Component (FPC) of the Stewardship Grade factors, funds in the top, middle and bottom group (approximately 30% in each of the top and bottom groups and the remaining 
40% in the middle group) are ranked 3, 2 and 1 respectively. symbols 2_1, 3_2 and 3_1 denote the difference in mean performance measures between the middle and bottom, 
top and middle and top and bottom groups respectively. Numbers in parentheses are the Newey-West adjusted t-test (4 lags) standard errors. The symbols *, ** and *** 
denote respectively significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
                  
Difference in 
mean between 
groups SR SG SG*SR   FPC FPC*SR
2_1  0.0702***    0.0147    0.0181    -0.00392    0.0203 
  (0.0188)   (0.0247)    (0.0295)    (0.0137)    (0.0180) 
3_2  0.0415***    -0.0175    0.00121    0.045358***    0.0561** 
  (0.0125)   (0.0178)    (0.0344)    (0.0110)    (0.0236) 
3_1  0.1116***    -0.0028    0.01931    0.041434**    0.0764*** 
  (0.0232)    (0.0352)    (0.0293)    (0.0169)    (0.0284)   50
 
 
Table 5 
 
Regressions of Risk-adjusted Returns on Mutual Fund Ratings 
 
 
We  report estimates of  regressions to examine the extent to which Morningstar’s Stewardship Grades and/or Star Ratings predict future return using yearly 
data comprising the December samples spanning December 2005 (respectively December 2007) through December 2010 in Panel A (respectively Panel B). 
The regression specification is                                                                 Sit =  b
T Ratingit +  c 
T x + eit. 
Sit (in %) is the one-year Carhart’s four-factor alpha. Ratingit is a vector of variables that are one or a combination of the following mutual fund ratings 
variables: lagged raw score of Star Rating (SR), lagged raw score of Stewardship Grade (SG), lagged raw score of the five stewardship components –  
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ) ,  Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH), and the First Principal Component 
(FPC) score derived from the stewardship component scores via principal component analysis. x is a vector of control variables known to be related to mutual 
fund performance. Control variables in x include lagged expense ratio and turnover ratio obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, lagged fund flow, 
lagged logarithm of fund total net asset (in millions), lagged logarithm of fund age (in months) and lagged four factor alpha. We estimate three different 
models, each with various specifications involving a different set of independent variables.    
(Model Specification EX )  A static panel fixed time effect model. 
(Model  Specification  EN)  Two-stage least squares regression model  The instrumental variables used here include prior(one-year) values of the 
following variables : average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. Fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and 
turnover ratio.  
(Model Specification DY)   Dynamic Panel model  Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For specification (SGA_DY): 
prior one-year and two-year values of Sit, prior one-year values of each of:  average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. 
Fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio; for specifications (SR_DY) , (SG_DY) and (FPC_DY):  
prior one-year values of each of:  average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. Fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, 
log(size) and turn over ratio 
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Panel A (December 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
 
                           (Model Spec EX)                (Model Spec EN)  (Model  Spec DYN) 
Explanatory Variables      (SR_EX) (SG_EX)  (FPC_EX)      (SR_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)      (SGA_DY)  (SR_DY)  (SG_DY)  (FPC_DY) 
intercept      0.0065 0.1385  0.1611     -0.1545** -0.6085*** -0.5740***           
      (0.1468) (0.1169)  (0.1136)      (0.0672) (0.1485)  (0.1359)           
lagged BQ                        0.9279      
                        (1.0279)      
lagged CC                        -6.7727**      
                        (2.6809)      
lagged FS                        2.5338      
                        (1.6828)      
lagged MI                        1.3709      
                        (2.0148)      
lagged RH                        -2.19829      
                        (3.0429)      
Lagged SR raw score      0.0309**         0.0899**          0.4030*     
      (0.0124)         (0.0351)          (0.2081)     
lagged SG raw score       0.0045        0.1279***           0.1971   
       (0.0063)        (0.0326)           (0.1999)   
lagged FPC          0.0013        0.2963***           0.35707 
         (0.0124)        (0.0681)           (0.436) 
lagged FF alpha                         -0.0124  -0.4369*  -0.2767 -0.2487 
                         (0.12)  (0.2278)  (0.2722) (0.2701) 
lagged turn over ratio      -0.0005 -0.0009  -0.0009     -0.0005 -0.0003  -0.0006     0.0101*  0.0007  0.0005 0.0004 
      (0.5003) (0.0008)  (0.0009)     (0.0007) (0.0007)  (0.0007)    (0.0056)  (0.0010)  (0.0018) (0.0019) 
lagged size      -0.0061** 0.0085*  0.0098**     -0.0165** -0.0358*** -0.0376***    -0.2839**  -
0.444***  -0.4096** -0.4007*** 
      (0.0021) (0.0046)  (0.0044)     (0.0077) (0.0117)  (0.0101)     (0.1346) (0.0624)  (0.1371) (0.1382) 
lagged age      -0.0081 -0.0379  -0.0389                    
      (0.0259) (0.0262)  (0.0262)                    
Fixed Time Effect      Yes Yes  Yes      Yes Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect     No No  No     No No  No     No  No  No No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference) 
 
  No No  No     No No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
N      880 880  880      875 875  875     828  828        828  828 
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Panel B (December 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
 
    (Specification EX)    (Specification EN) 
   (SR_EX)  (SG_EX)  (FPC_EX)    (SR_EN)  (SG_EN)  (FPC_EN) 
Intercept   -0.1710**  0.0163 0.040096    -0.1250  -0.6640*** -0.5969*** 
     (0.0792) (0.1151)  (0.1114)    (0.0822)  (0.2537) (0.2272) 
lagged BQ               
                
lagged CC               
                
lagged FS               
                
lagged MI               
                
lagged RH               
                
Lagged SR raw score    0.0355**       0.0615*     
   (0.0142)       (0.0371)     
lagged SG raw score      0.0012       0.1436**   
       (0.0089)       (0.0590)   
lagged FPC       -0.00777        0.3157** 
        (0.0173)        (0.1256) 
lagged turn over ratio    -0.0003  -0.0004 -0.000444    -0.0002  0.0003 -0.00037 
     (0.0009)  (0.0010) (0.0010)    (0.0008)  (0.0007) (0.0010) 
lagged size    -0.0063**  0.0087 0.010469*    -0.0008  -0.0432* -0.04177** 
     (0.0025)  (0.0059) (0.0055)    (0.0056)  (0.0222) (0.0202) 
lagged age    0.0217  -0.0117 -0.012693        
     (0.0166)  (0.0272) (0.0272)        
Fixed Time Effect    Yes Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect    No No  No    No  No  No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference)   No  No  No    No  No  No 
N   874  874  874    869  869  869   53
 
Table 6 
 
We  report estimates of  regressions to examine the relation between  Morningstar’s Star Rating and prior period Stewardship Grades or stewardship 
component grades. In Panel A (respectively B) , yearly data from the  December samples spanning 2005 (respectively 2007)  through 2010  is used. In Panel 
C (respectively D) , monthly data from  November 2004 (respectively January 2007)  through May 2011  is used.  The regression specification is 
 
SRit =   b
T Ratingit +  c 
T x + eit. 
SRit is the Morningstar Star Rating of fund I at year t.. Ratingit is a vector of variables that are one or a combination of the following mutual fund ratings 
variables: lagged raw score of Star Rating (SR), lagged raw score of Stewardship Grade (SG), lagged raw score of the five stewardship components –  
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ) ,  Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH), and the First Principal Component 
(FPC) score derived from the stewardship component scores via principal component analysis. x is a vector of control variables known to be related to mutual 
fund performance. Control variables in x include lagged turnover ratio obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, lagged logarithm of fund total net asset 
(in millions), contemporaneous average and longest manager tenure, contemporaneous logarithm of fund age (in months) and contemporaneous absolute fund 
flow. We estimate three different models, each with various specifications involving a different set of independent variables.    
 
Yearly Regression (Panel A and B) 
(Model Specification EX )  A static panel fixed time effect model. 
(Model Specification EN)  Two-stage least squares regression model. For (SGA_EN), the instrumental variables used here include contemporaneous 
values of the following variables : average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  Fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, 
log(size) and turnover ratio and prior one-year stewardship component grades  (BQ, CC, FS, MI and RH). For (SG_EN), 
instruments used are contemporaneous values of the following variables : average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  
Fund flows,  log (age), turnover ratio 
(Model  Specification  DY)  Dynamic Panel model.  Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For all specifications, 
instruments used are  prior one-year and two-year  raw scores of SR and contemporaneous values of  average manager tenure, 
longest manager tenure, Fund flows,  log (age), log(size) and turn over ratio.   54
Monthly Regression Panel C and D  
(Model Specification EX )  A static panel fixed time effect model. 
(Model Specification EN)  Two-stage least squares regression model. For (SGA_EN), the instrumental variables used here include prior one-month 
values of the following variables : first principal component of Stewardship Grades, average manager tenure, longest 
manager tenure,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio. For (FPC_EN) and (SG_EN), instruments used are 
prior one-month values of the following variables : average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  log (age), expense ratio, 
log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows. 
(Model Specification DYN )  Dynamic Panel model   
Panel C  Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For specification (SGA_DY) and (SG_DY): prior one- and two-month 
raw Star Rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense 
ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows. For specification (FPC_DY): prior one- and two-month raw Star Rating raw scores, prior one-
month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio , fund 
flows and a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the time period is in or after January 2007. 
Panel D  Instrumental variables used in specification (FPC_DY) are prior one- and two-month raw Star Rating raw scores, prior one-month values of 
the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio , fund flows and a dummy 
that takes a value of 1 if the time period is in or after January 2007.   Instrumental variables used in all other specifications are prior one- and 
two-month raw Star Rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  
expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows 
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Panel A (December 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
Dependent variable: Star Rating Raw Scores (SRRaw). :  Dec 2005, Dec 2006, 2007, Dec 2008, Dec 2009 and Dec 2010 
   (Specification EX)  (Specification EN)  (Specification DY) 
      (SGA_EX) (SG_EX) (FPC_EX)  (SGA_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)  (SGA_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
intercept    2.4765***  2.7338***  2.777***  1.2699***  -1.7823***  -1.4998***       
    (0.1371)  (0.1065)  (0.1502)  (0.052)  (0.6434) (0.5527)       
lagged BQ    0.15445***     0.1872***        3.1509*    
    (0.0313)     (0.0395)        (1.6153)    
lagged CC    0.1538***     0.20603***        0.2960    
    (0.0404)     (0.0454)        (1.0188)    
lagged FS    -0.0576***     -0.08481***        2.9335**    
    (0.0209)     (0.0208)        (1.1957)    
lagged MI    0.0361     0.0774*        0.7044    
    (0.0385)     (0.0404)        (1.3131)    
lagged RH    0.1433***     0.1648***        1.8598*    
    (0.0401)     (0.0430)        (0.9807)    
lagged SG raw score      0.0771***      0.8295***        1.9355***   
      (0.0086)      (0.1685)        (0.5835)   
lagged FPC        0.1822***      1.7811***       2.5108*** 
        (0.0212)      (0.3300)       (0.6054) 
lagged SR raw score                  0.1317** 0.2182***  0.3158*** 
                  (0.0670) (0.0674) (0.0521) 
Lagged Turn over ratio    0.0029***  0.0031*** 0.0032  0.0022* 0.0066***  0.0050***    0.000729 0.0014  -0.0011 
    (0.0011)  (0.0011) (0.0019)  (0.0011) (0.0021)  (0.0016)    (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0012) 
Lagged Size    0.1816***  0.1789*** 0.1770***  0.1686*** -0.1021  -0.0705    0.2427*** 0.1867** 0.2443*** 
    (0.0097)  (0.0124) (0.0097)  (0.0082) (0.0749)  (0.0605)    (0.0932) (0.0735) (0.0678) 
Avg manager tenure    0.0198**  0.0203*** 0.0200***             
    (0.0019)  (0.0033) (0.0050)             
Longest manager tenure    0.0015  0.002 0.0036             
    (0.0038)  (0.0015) (0.0036)             
Absolute flows    2.55E-05  2.52E-05 2.23E-05             
    (2.61E-05)  (2.56E-05) (1.63E-05)          
Age    -0.2417***  -0.2727*** -0.2813***          
    (0.0256)  (0.0226) (0.0260)          
Fixed Time Effect    Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect    No  No No  No  No No    No  No  No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)          No  No No           No No  No           Yes Yes Yes 
N          1088  1088 1088       1088 1088  1088          1029 1029 1029   56
Panel B (December 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
Dependent variable: Star Rating Raw Scores (SRRaw). :  Dec 2007, Dec 2008, Dec 2009 and Dec 2010 
   (Specification EX)  (Specification EN)  (Specification DY) 
      (SGA_EX) (SG_EX) (FPC_EX)  (SGA_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)  (SGA_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
intercept    2.3515*** 2.7063***  2.7194***  1.2935*** -3.2970***  -2.5787***       
    (0.2164) (0.1711)  (0.1969)  (0.0815) (1.1445)  (0.7433)       
lagged BQ    0.11525***     0.1238***        1.2214     
    (0.0253)     (0.0276)        (1.6101)     
lagged CC    0.1141***     0.1592***        1.4927     
    (0.0473)     (0.0520)        (1.2459)     
lagged FS    -0.08987***     -0.1175***        1.5762     
    (0.0252)     (0.0251)        (1.2973)     
lagged MI    0.0648     0.1068        -1.6448     
    (0.0664)     (0.0676)        (1.4324)     
lagged RH    0.1818***  0.1969***        1.4162   
    (0.0551)     (0.0614)        (1.9965)     
lagged SG raw score     0.0611***    1.2506***      1.2394***   
     (0.0043)      (0.3027)        (0.4458)   
lagged FPC        0.1486***     2.4299***       3.0000*** 
       (0.0283)     (0.4645)        (0.7991) 
lagged SR raw score               0.1284 0.2271***  0.1893*** 
               (0.0903) (0.0558) (0.0567) 
Turn over ratio    0.0023 0.003* 0.003  0.0016 0.0098**  0.0052*    0.0007 -0.0012  0.000336 
    (0.0015) (0.0014)  (0.0024)  (0.0017) (0.0046)  (0.0029)    (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Size    0.1817*** 0.1763***  0.1726***  0.1754*** -0.3087** -0.1853**    0.3992*** 0.1766*** 0.2508*** 
    (0.0158) (0.0189)  (0.0121)  (0.0107) (0.1373)  (0.0883)    (0.1436) (0.0675) (0.0784) 
Avg manager tenure    0.0269*** 0.0263***  0.0258***            
    (0.0032) (0.0025)  (0.0065)           
Longest manager tenure    -0.0024** -0.0006  0.0008           
    (0.0011) (0.0010)  (0.0046)           
Absolute flows    1.85E-05 1.85E-05  1.75E-05           
    (1.87E-05) (1.83E-05)  (1.68E-05)           
Age    -0.2151*** -0.2536***  -0.2548***           
    (0.0387) (0.0356)  (0.0347)           
Fixed Time Effect    Yes Yes  Yes  No No No    Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect    No No  No  Yes Yes Yes    No  No  No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)          No  No No    No No No          Yes Yes Yes 
N       1067  1067 1067    1067  1067  1067          1013 1013 1013   57
Panel C (Monthly Samples From November 2004 to May 2011) 
Dependent variable: Star Rating Raw Scores (SRRaw) Sample : Dec 2004 to May 2011 
  
  (SGA_EX)  (FPC_EX)  (SG_EX)   (SGA_EN)  (FPC_EN)  (SG_EN)   (SGA_DY)  (FPC_DY)  (SG_DY) 
intercept  1.3169***  1.4168***  1.4226*** 2.2050*** -1.8918***  -1.9953***
  (0.0170)  (0.0185)  (0.0167)   (0.1709)  (0.2427)  (0.1968)        
lagged BQ  0.1636***       -0.0800       0.02490***     
  (0.0118)       (0.1892)       (0.0040)     
lagged CC  0.251***       2.4502***       0.01267**     
  (0.0123)       (0.1457)       (0.0061)     
lagged FS  -0.0726***       -1.5774***      -0.03933***     
  (0.0051)       (0.0726)       (0.0016)     
lagged MI  0.045***       0.0621       0.01093***     
  (0.0112)       (0.0877)       (0.0017)     
lagged RH  0.1401***       -0.7773***      0.08852***     
  (0.0095)        (0.1551)      (0.0022)     
lagged SG 
raw score      0.0976***      0.8388***      0.0270*** 
       (0.0029)       (0.0469)       (8.78E-06) 
lagged FPC    0.2372***       1.97458***      0.0514***   
    (0.0064)       (0.1296)       (0.0001)  
lagged SR 
raw score                 0.6866*** 0.6845***  0.6883*** 
                 (0.0004)  (2.56E-05)  (8.69E-06) 
lagged turn 
over ratio 
0.0028*** 
0.0030***  0.0032***   -0.000142  0.005243***  0.007335***   0.000224*  0.0003***  0.0002*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)   (0.0011)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0001)  (5.32E-06) (1.20E-06) 
lagged size  0.1482***  0.1387**  0.1417***   0.1954***  -0.09399***  -0.08354***   0.03587***  0.0066***  0.0356*** 
  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0024)   (0.0061)  (0.0203)  (0.0186)  (0.0008)  (0.0001)  (9.80E-06) 
lagged 
expense 
ratio 
-0.0011*** 
-0.0007** 
-0.0011***      
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)               
lagged avg 
manager 
tenure 
0.0194***  0.0216***  0.0205***  
    
 
    
  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)                
lagged 
absolute 
flows 
6.98E-05** 
7.24E-05** 
7.25E-05**  
    
 
    
  ( 3.53E-05)  (3.6E-05 )  (3.62E-05)                
Lagged age                 -0.5635***  -0.4678***  -0.5163*** 
                 (0.0088)  (0.0005)  (4.19E-05) 
D_crisis                   -0.0527***   
                   (5.16E-05)     58
                      
  (SGA_EX)  (FPC_EX)  (SG_EX) (SGA_EN) (FPC_EN)  (SG_EN) (SGA_DY) (FPC_DY) (SG_DY)
Fixed Time 
Effect 
Yes Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes    No  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Fund 
Effect 
No No  No    No  No  No    No  No  No 
Fixed Fund 
Effect 
(Difference) 
No No  No    No  No  No    Yes  No  No 
N 1273  1273 1273 1273 1273 1273 1208 1208 1208
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Panel D (Monthly Samples From January 2007 to May 2011) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Star Rating Raw Scores  (SRRaw) Sample : January 2007 to May 2011 
 
  Specification EX    Specification EN 
  (SGA_EX) (FPC_EX) (SG_EX)    (SGA_EN)  (FPC_EN) (SG_EN) 
intercept  1.2772*** 1.425***  1.4307***    2.8552***  -3.6891**** -2.9308*** 
  (0.0264)  (0.0247)  (0.0208)    (0.2033)  (0.3725)  (0.2536) 
lagged BQ  0.1182***       0.08509     
  (0.0144)       (0.1703)    
lagged CC  0.2153***       2.9896***    
  (0.0130)       (0.0933)    
lagged FS  -0.09999***       -1.856***    
  (0.0045)       (0.0751)    
lagged MI  0.0965***       -0.2688***    
  (0.0136)       (0.0776)    
lagged RH  0.1604***       -1.2844***    
  (0.0123)       (0.1039)    
lagged SG raw score     0.0802***      1.06658*** 
     (0.0022)      (0.0588) 
lagged FPC    0.1949***        2.9766****   
    (0.0058)        (0.1910)   
lagged turn over ratio  0.0028*** 0.003***  0.0032***    -0.0031**  0.0052****  0.008252*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)   (0.0015)  (0.0008)  (0.0006) 
lagged size  0.1536*** 0.1452***  0.1467***   0.2026***  -0.2553****  -0.1831*** 
  (0.0029)  (0.0025)  (0.0027)   (0.0080)  (0.0277)  (0.0226) 
lagged expense ratio  -0.0012*** -0.0008***  -0.0011***      
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)      
lagged avg manager tenure  0.021*** 0.0242***  0.0234***       
  (0.0006)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)      
lagged absolute flows  0.0000415*  4.32E-05* 4.36E-05**       
  (2.36E-05)  (2.40E-05)  (2.42E-05)       
Fixed Time Effect  Yes Yes  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect  No No  No    No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)  No  No  No   No  No  No 
N 1250  1250  1250   1250  1250  1250   60
Panel D (‘contd) 
Dependent Variable : Star Rating Raw Scores. Sample: Jan 2007 to May 2011 
  (Specification DY) 
 (SGA_DY)  (DSGA_DY)  (DFPC_DY)  (DSG_DY)  (FPC_DY)  (SG_DY)  (FPC_DY2) 
lagged BQ  0.01947***             
 (8.33E-05)             
lagged CC  0.03903***             
 (4.03E-05)             
lagged FS  -0.02026***             
 (4.11E-05)             
lagged MI  0.05483***             
 (4.02E-05)             
lagged RH  0.1017***             
 (3.35E-05)             
lagged SG raw score            0.0491***   
          (9.16E-05)   
lagged  FPC        0.0788****    0.0657*** 
        (0.0007)    (1.83E-05) 
lagged SR raw score  0.7440***  0.7501***  0.7469***  0.7501***  0.7428****  0.7454***  0.6921*** 
 (6.11E-06)  (0.0005)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (1.85E-05)  (2.76E-06) 
lagged SR raw score (lag 2)              0.1430*** 
            (4.28E-06) 
Lagged First Difference of BQ    -0.0181***           
   (0.0056)         
Lagged First Difference of CC    0.0562***           
   (0.0061)         
Lagged First Difference of FS    -0.0845***           
   (0.0026)         
Lagged First Difference of MI    -0.0280***           
   (0.0045)         
Lagged First Difference of RI    -0.0288*           
   (0.0036)         
Lagged First Difference of PC1      -0.0155****         
     (0.0006)         
Lagged First Difference of SG raw score        -0.0206***       
      (0.0003)       
lagged turn over ratio  0.000133***  7.50E-05***  0.0002****  8.65E-05***  0.0003****  0.0001***  0.0005*** 
  (7.68E-07) (3.97E-05) (8.34E-06)  (2.25E-05)  (1.40E-05)  (3.80E-06)  (9.85E-07) 
lagged size  0.02407***  0.0246***  -0.0208****  0.0244***  -0.0057****  0.0300***  -0.0574*** 
 (2.53E-05)  (0.0009)  (0.0004)  (0.0006)  (0.0002)  (7.16E-05)  (2.61E-05) 
lagged  age  -0.5261*** -0.3656*** -0.3731***  -0.3571***  -0.4055****  -0.4278***  -0.2971*** 
 (1.40E-04)  (0.0047)  (0.0019)  (0.0024)  (0.0021)  (0.0008)  (1.51E-04) 
D_crisis(-1)     -0.0435***    -0.0494****    -0.0486*** 
     (0.0002)    (0.0001)    (4.25E-06) 
Fixed Time Effect  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Fixed Fund Effect  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  1146 1146 1146  1146  1146  1146  1146 
 